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UNION DISCIPLINE UNDER SECTION 8(b)(1)(A)
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TRILOGY
FRANcIs T. COLEmAN*
INTRODUCTION
Last year, for the third successive term, the Supreme Court
delivered an opinion examining the permissible ambit of union dis-
cipline under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA).1 Scofield v. NLRB,2 the most recent of the three decisions,
and NLPB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,3 decided two years
earlier, deal with judicial enforcement of union fines levied against
nonconforming members. Sandwiched between them is NLRB v.
Local 22, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers,4 a
case dealing with the expulsion of union members for their having
failed to first exhaust internal union procedures before filing unfair
labor practice charges against their union. Together, these cases pro-
vide an interesting if not definitive commentary on the controversial
subject of accommodating the institutional needs of unions with the
freedom of the individual union member.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that
[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-... to restrain or coerce.., employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein .... 5
The section 7 rights to which reference is made include
the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid to protection,
* A.B., Georgetown University, 1961; J.D., Georgetown University, 1964; LL.M., George-
town University, 1970.
149 Stat. 452 (1935), amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), codified, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1964). The popular names for these legislative enactments are, respectively, The Wagner
Act and The Taft-Hartley Act.
2 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
8388 U.S. 175, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 892 (1967).
4 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
529 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3). 6
Structurally, section 8(b)(1)(A) resembles its 8(a) counterpart
which was enacted twelve years earlier.7 Indeed, except for the deletion
of the word "interference" and the inclusion of a provision, 8(b)(1)(A)
is linguistically identical to the comparable prescription of unlawful
employer activities.8 Substantively, however, the two sections have ex-
perienced a much different judicial history. In general, the types of
employer conduct forbidden by the statute have remained relatively
uniform, whereas in recent years Board and court decisions have greatly
enlarged the types of union conduct proscribed by the Act.
The first Supreme Court decision to scrutinize the scope of 8(b)
(1)(A)'s prohibitions was NLRB v. Teamster Local 639 (Curtis Broth-
ers).9 In that case, the Court refused to stretch 8(b)(1)(A)'s prohibitions
to include peaceful organizational picketing. After reviewing the legis-
lative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, the Court held
that the underlying intent of 8(b)(1)(A) was to outlaw union-engineered
violence or direct economic reprisal designed to coerce employees into
enlisting behind a union banner or involuntarily participating in their
activities. Peaceful picketing, the Court concluded, did not fit the mold
of these pressure tactics, and consequently, did not violate 8(b)(1)(A). 10
In the years following Curtis Brothers, however, it became appar-
ent that physical threats and intimidation were not the only types of
union abuses that needed curbing. Under the NLRA, exclusive bar-
gaining status is accorded unions representing a majority of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit." This right of exclusivity has, over
the years, enabled organized labor to wield tremendous leverage, not
only vis-4-vis management, but vis-5.-vis employees as well. Eventually,
patent abuse of this power led first the NLRB and then reviewing
6 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) (emphasis added).
7 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended and codified, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
s The section provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7." Id.
9 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
10 Subsequent to the grant of certiorari in this case, but before the Supreme Court's
decision, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA,
popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 136 (1959), amending 29 U.S.C. §§
153 et seq. passim, codified, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1964). LMRDA section 704(e) amended
the NLRA to include a new section, 8(b)(7), regulating organizational and recognitional
picketing. Three members of the Court would have remanded the case for consideration in
light of this legislation. Undoubtedly, this fact also influenced the majority's disposition.
1129 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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courts to reexamine the narrow dimensions which Curtis Brothers had
placed upon 8(b)(1)(A).
In Miranda Fuel Co.,12 the Board, for the first time since passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act, construed 8(b)(1)(A) to proscribe a union's
failure to fully and fairly represent its constituents. 3 Such a result was
achieved by reading this duty of fair representation into section 9(c)' 4
and then transporting it into section 7 for inclusion as an employee
protected right. 5 This decision greatly expanded NLRB control over
areas which had theretofore been considered matters exclusively within
the province of internal union administration and policy. 6 Subsequent
Board and court decisions have followed this liberalized interpreta-
tion' 7 and have sought to further scrutinize internal union conduct
which tends to undermine employee rights protected by the statute.,
Now, 8(b)(1)(A) is again in the spotlight. This time, the inquiry,
12 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
13 In a series of decisions dating back twenty-six years, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the right to exclusive bargaining status conferred by section 9 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, entails a corresponding duty on the part of labor organizations
to fairly serve the interests of all those they represent. See Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers
Int'l, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g mem. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944). It was not until Miranda Fuel Co., however, that the Board first recognized a
breach of this duty as an unfair labor practice.
1429 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
15 See Note, Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB:
A Proposal, 54 Com'R. L. Rav. 943, 946-47 (1969).
16 This interpretation which validates the finding of an 8(b)(1)(A) violation based upon
breach of the duty of fair representation has been the subject of criticism by Member
Fanning, former Chairman McCulloch and others. In particular, this criticism is based
upon the fact that there is no legislative or historical foundation for placing the right to
fair representation among the rights protected by section 7. See NLRB v. Miranda Fuel
Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion); Local 12, United Rubber Workers,
150 N.L.R.B. 312, 324 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,
1578 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (dissenting
opinion); see also Fanning, Individual Rights in the Negotiation and Administration of.
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 LAB. LJ. 224 (1968); Note, Administrative Enforce-
ment of the Right to Fair Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 718
(1964). But see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) wherein the Supreme Court assumed
arguendo that the Board was correct in holding breach of the duty of fair representation
to be an unfair labor practice.
17 See, e.g., Baltimore Luggage Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1230, enforced, 387 F.2d 744 (4th Cir.
1967); Red Ball Motor Freight, 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), enforced, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Aristocrat Linen Supply Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1965); Archer Laundry Co., 150
N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
18 It might be added that one appellate court has now come full circle by holding that
an employer is also guilty of violating his employees' section 7 rights if he discriminates
against them because of racial considerations. See United Packinghouse Intl v. NLRB,
416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), enforcing as modified, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 67 L.R.R.M.
1266 (Jan. 25, 1968).
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broadly phrased, is: to what extent does 8(b)(1)(A) limit a union's
ability to control its membership? The three Supreme Court cases and
their aftermath, which form the subject matter of this paper, attempt
to shed some light on the vexing questions raised by this inquiry. Un-
fortunately, as has often been the case with controversial Court cases,
these decisions have raised as many questions as they purport to resolve,
and subsequent Board and Court decisions are still in the process of
completing the Court's unfinished business. Because of the significance
of these decisions, time may well prove these three cases worthy of the
label the "new trilogy," in obvious reference to the Supreme Court's
celebrated arbitration decisions of the early sixties which had such a
profound impact on labor contract enforcement.' 9
Chronologically, the cases were argued before the Supreme Court
in the following order: Allis-Chalmers, Shipbuilding Workers and
Scofield. Although Scofield was the first of the three cases to come to
the attention of the Board,20 it is appropriate to begin the discussion
with the Allis-Chalmers case because it was the first to receive Supreme
Court review and, consequently, provided the framework into which
its successors were to be fitted.
ALLIS-CHALMERS
The facts in Allis-Chalmers are quite simple. Certain UAW
members employed at two of Allis-Chalmers' Wisconsin plants refused
to honor picket lines set up by their local unions during economic
strikes at their respective plants and continued to work. At the strike's
conclusion, these members were tried and found guilty of "conduct
unbecoming a union member" and fined sums ranging from twenty to
one hundred dollars. Some refused to pay and the union brought suit
for collection in a Wisconsin state court. The company filed unfair
labor practice charges against the union, claiming that court enforce-
ment of the fines constituted "restraint and coercion" within the mean-
ing of 8(b)(1)(A). The General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint
which the Board set aside on the ground that the fines and their col-
lection were permissible under 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso allowing unions
to make their own rules regarding union membership. 21
19 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). Together, these cases dearly delineated the
respective roles of courts and arbitrators in the resolution of disputes over grievances be-
tween parties who had contracted to settle such disputes through arbitration.
20 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964). The case was decided on January 17. The next case of
the trilogy to come before the NLRB was Allis-Chalmers, decided on October 23, 1964.
21 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
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In dismissing the complaint, the Board distinguished between
union discipline that affects a member in his status as an employee
and that which affects him only in his capacity as a union member. The
Board held, that though the former, with certain limited exceptions, was
clearly outlawed, the latter form of discipline was authorized by the
proviso. Judicial enforcement of fines was thus protected, according
to the Board's majority, since such a measure left job rights unimpaired.
Furthermore, they maintained, a rule requiring union members to re-
frain from working during a strike was vital to the achievement of
legitimate trade union objectives and was not otherwise violative of
labor law policy.2 2
In dissent, Member Leedom noted that any fine is by its very
nature coercive and that enforcement through legal recourse exceeds
anything permitted by the proviso's exemption. Even accepting the
distinction between employment and membership rights fashioned
by the majority, Mr. Leedom was convinced that the fines in issue,
since designed to inhibit members from working, directly affected
employment rights, not merely membership ones.2 3 Thus, in his opin-
ion, the issuance of the complaint should have been upheld.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's reliance on 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso,
but nonetheless upheld its conclusion. 24 A review of 8(b)(1)(A)'s legis-
lative history led the court to adopt the restricted interpretation es-
poused by the Supreme Court in Curtis Brothers, i.e., that 8(b)(1)(A)'s
sanctions were aimed at the "specific evils of force, violence and threats
thereof, ... [rather than at] fines collectible by legal process. '25 Since
the fines did not fall within the body of the statute, it was unnecessary
to rely on the proviso's language to sustain them. Even more funda-
mental, the panel believed, was the principle of majority rule. Once
the organization has made the decision to strike, it is incumbent on all
members to adhere to it; those failing to do so being properly subject
to discipline.2 6
22 The Board emphasized the fact that when the strike and picket line are lawful, it
is certainly within a union's province to seek recourse against members who undermine
their collective efforts. Id. at 69.
23[I~t will come as a surprise to the affected individual when he is told that a
union fine designed to induce him to respect picket lines and stay away from hisjob does not touch him as an employee, but only as a union member. One of the
indispensable factors in any employment relationship is the employee's willingness
to come to work.
Id. at 73 (dissenting opinion).
24 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, No. 14,853 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1965).
25 Id.
26 A union is a form of industrial government, and the rights and duties of a mem-
ber are similar to those of a citizen in a democratic society.... The employees
... in this case had the right, under Section 7, to strike or not to strike. But once
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW[
Slightly less than six months later, however, the panel's decision
was reversed by the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc.27 Ironically, two
of I the three panel members who had earlier voted to uphold the fines
reversed themselves, thereby creating a 4-3 majority to overturn the
Board's, as well as their own, previous decision. Adopting a different
analysis of the union-member relationship than the panel, the full
court declared that "[a]ll the protections which Congress has seen fit
to throw about the union member operate to diminish the authority
and power of the union to police its members by coercion and to that
degree impose on the union the burden of achieving its ends by per-
suasion, rather than by penal exaction. '28 Using this premise, the
court went on to hold that substantial fines can be just as coercive on
union member rights as other less subtle forms of force and coercion.
The coercive aspect of fines is particularly apparent in cases such as
this one, the full court observed, where the fines had been assessed
against members whose membership was the product of a union secu-
rity clause.29 In light of these considerations, the court was disinclined
to abandon a literal reading of the statute, which even the panel agreed
would have covered court enforcement of fines, in favor of an inter-
pretation which would subvert the freedom of individual union mem-
bers.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, reversed the Seventh Circuit
and affirmed the Board's dismissal of the complaint.30 The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, found it "highly unrealistic"
to regard the terms "restrain or coerce" used in section 8(b)(1)(A)
as unambiguously applicable to court enforcement of union fines.
Rather, after an extended examination of the legislative history, the
majority concluded that 8(b)(1)(A)'s drafters never intended that it
apply to union discipline in general or disciplinary fines in particular. 31
the union voted to strike, the employees who were union members were bound by
the limitations that union membership placed on their right not to strike. It
would be difficult to accept the proposition that a union should be the one secular
society in our nation which one may enter without being bound by majority rule
and without submission to some limitations on rights for the common good. Upon
entering, union members must take not only the benefits but the burdens also.
Id.
This conclusion, the court maintained, was fortified by the proviso to section 102 of
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964), which safeguards the right of unions to
pass and enforce reasonable rules as to its members with respect to their union respon-
sibility. "[W]hat greater responsibility could a union member have to the union as an
institution than to support a lawful strike called by the majority?" Id.
27 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
28 Id. at 660.
29 Id. at 660-61.
30 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
31 Id. at 186.
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Furthermore, the statute's history exhibited no desire on the part of
Congress to treat court enforcement of fines any differently than their
enforcement through expulsion, a method explicitly sanctioned by 8(b)
(1)(A)'s proviso. Drawing such a distinction would be patently unfair
to weaker unions, the Court maintained, since expulsion, while a power-
ful weapon in the hands of strong unions, was an impotent device in
the hands of weaker unions. Moreover, from strictly a policy stand-
point, it was emphasized that depriving unions of the right to fine
strikebreakers would significantly impair labor's cherished strike weap-
ons which the courts had theretofore gone to great lengths to protect.
Finally, the Court observed that at the time 8(b)(1)(A) was adopted,
the contract theory of the union-membership relationship was vogue,
with the rights and duties arising therefrom subject to judicial enforce-
ment.32 Since the disciplined UAW members were full-fledged union
members, not mere dues payers, their acceptance of the responsibilities
incident to union membership could not be brushed aside as involun-
tary and, hence, they were therefore properly subject to union disci-
pline. Thus, without reliance on the proviso, the majority held that
8(b)(1)(A) did not ban judicial enforcement of validly imposed fines,
at least where they serve to protect legitimate trade union interests.
Mr. Justice White concurred, but on the more restricted basis
that in many cases, "certainly in this one ... expulsion would ... be
a far more coercive technique for enforcing a union rule and for col-
lecting a reasonable fine than the threat of court enforcement." 33
Under his analysis, the greater penalty, the right to expel, which was
expressly authorized by the proviso, included the lesser right of en-
forcement through fines which was not expressly authorized.
The four dissenters34 made their own independent survey of 8(b)
(l)(A)'s history and concluded that, because of its brevity, ambiguity
and inconclusiveness, a departure from the literal language of the
statute was unwarranted. 35 Mr. Justice Black, the dissent's author,
claimed that court collection of union fines was clearly coercive within
the plain meaning of the statute and that this interpretation comported
with both legislative and judicial history. In his eyes, the majority's
analysis was but a subterfuge for subordinating the rights of individual
union members to the need of weak unions to effectively deter strike-
breaking. Such an "unarticulated premise," he assefted, was an argu-
82 Id. at 192.
38 Id. at 198 (concurring opinion).
34 Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart.
31 388 U.S. at 217 (dissenting opinion).
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ment properly addressed to Congress, not one cognizable by a court
confronted with a clear statutory mandate.a6
SHIPBUILDING WORKERS
Slightly less than a year after Allis-Chalmers, the second case of the
new trilogy, Shipbuilding Workers, was decided by the Supreme Court.
In this case, the union sanction involved not court collection of a fine,
but expulsion from union membership, the mode of discipline which
the Justices unanimously agreed would have been upheld in the con-
text of Allis-Chalmers.
Again, the facts are uncomplicated. Holder, a member of the
Shipbuilding Workers Union, filed unfair labor practice charges against
his local union and its president without having first exhausted his
internal union remedies. As a result, Holder was tried, convicted and
expelled by his local union for violation of the international con-
stitution, which required members with complaints against the union
to exhaust their union remedies before resorting to outside courts or
tribunals.8 7 Thereupon, Holder once again filed charges with the
NLRB, this time claiming the union's action had coerced his exercise
of rights guaranteed by the Act.
The Board, adopting the trial examiner's finding, unanimously
held that Holder's expulsion violated 8(b)(1)(A).38 This conclusion was
said to be dictated by their earlier decision in Charles S. Skura.39 In
that case, the Board had struck down a fine imposed for the same
reasons, and it could now find no reason why expulsion should be
treated any differently.40 If a fine is by its nature coercive, then ex-
pulsion being the ultimate, not merely an intermediate step in the
union disciplinary chain, is even more coercive.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a well
reasoned opinion, denied enforcement.41 Initially, the court concluded
that, from the record it could not be determined whether Holder's
charge alleged a deprivation of section 7 rights.42 Absent such a finding,
86 Id. at 202 (dissenting opinion).
87 Section 5 of the international constitution provided that
(e]very member . . . considering himself . . . aggrieved by any action of this
Union, the [General Executive Board], a National Officer, a Local or other sub-
division of this Union shall exhaust all remedies and appeals within the Union,
provided by this Constitution, before he shall resort to any court or other tribunal
outside of the Union.
88 159 N.L.R.B. 1665 (1966).
39 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
40 159 N.L.R.B. at 1669.
41 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967).
42 The court observed that before a charge alleging infringement of employee section
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the court held that it was powerless to uphold an 8(b)(1)(A) violation.
A remand to the Board was deemed unnecessary, however, since the
proviso to section 101(A)(4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act,43 coupled with
8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, required dismissal of the complaint. The court
interpreted the former as permitting unions to discipline their mem-
bers for failing to first exhaust reasonable internal union procedures
prior to seeking Board or court relief, at least where such procedures
did not require a delay in excess of four months. The latter permits
unions to adopt their own rules for acquiring or forfeiting member-
ship. Reading these sections together, the court reasoned that the two
provisions enable labor unions to enact and enforce reasonable rules,
and the exhaustion rule, in the court's estimation, fell within this
category. Thus, the Third Circuit's reading of congressional intent,
gleaned from both the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act,
was that unions were free to require under threat of disciplinary action
that their members first internally process complaints against their
union before resorting to outside avenues of relief.
Brushing aside the acuity of the Third Circuit's reasoning, the
Supreme Court, by an 8-1 margin, reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion and affirmed the decision of the Board.44 Mr. Justice Douglas,
the majority spokesman, stated the crucial question as "whether con-
sistent with the applicable federal statutes a union [could] penalize
one of its members for seeking the aid of the Board without [first]
exhausting all internal union remedies." 4 The majority's answer was
an emphatic "no." The policy of keeping access to the Board unim-
peded, especially where public rights were involved, was so funda-
mental to the "functioning of the Act as an organic whole" that it
7 rights could be upheld, it must first be shown that the union has in some way interfered
with the type of activity protected by that section. Since section 7 says nothing about an
employee's right to file charges with the Board and since there was no showing that Holder's
original charges alleged union misconduct which violated his rights guaranteed by that sec-
tion, the court found no basis on which it could predicate a violation of 8(b)(1)(A).
43 Section l0l(A)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1964), provides:
Protection of the Right to Sue. -No labor organization shall limit the right
of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding be-
fore any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organiza-
tion or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or pro-
ceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness
in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legis-
lature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member
may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or
administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof:
And provided further, That no interested employer association shall directly or
indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action,
proceeding, appearance, or petition.
44 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
451d. at 421.
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overrode the lesser policy of allowing unions the opportunity to ini-
tially review charges levelled against them.46 Neither section 8(b)(1)(A)'s
proviso, nor the proviso to section 101(A)(4) of the Landrum-Griffin
Act required a contrary result, the Court maintained. The former, in
authorizing unions to fashion their own rules regarding membership
qualifications, did not enable them to penalize members for invoking
the assistance of a public agency created for the very purpose of hearing
complaints against unions and their officers. The latter proviso merely
conferred upon courts the discretion to refrain for a four-month period
from hearing a case pending internal union disposition. It did not
confer on unions the right to punish those who refuse to await the
lapse of this four-month period before taking legal action. Thus, at
least in instances where an employee's complaint is directed at his em-
ployer as well as at his union, the Court concluded that union members
may take their complaints directly to the Board or the courts without
fear of retaliation, union rules to the contrary notwithstanding.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, though he criticized the majority's
opinion for its failure to explicitly extend protection to complaints
involving strictly intra-union matters.47 The dissent of Mr. Justice
Stewart agreed with the logic of the Third Circuit's opinion.
SCOFIELD
The most recent Supreme Court 8(b)(1)(A) case and the last in
the new trilogy is Scofield, decided on April 1, 1969. Like Allis-
Chalmers, a case with which it shared many similarities, Scofield also
involved a UAW local which had gone to court to collect fines assessed
against some of its members.
The local union involved had been the recognized collective bar-
gaining representative at the charging party's Wisconsin motor plant
since 1937. Under the contract in effect at the time the case arose, an
incentive plan had been established covering about half the company's
production employees. Employees under this plan were guaranteed
a minimum hourly rate known as the machine rate, but had the oppor-
tunity to earn additional compensation if they produced in excess of
the quotas fixed by the contract. However, for many years the union
had established its own productivity ceiling, thereby controlling the
earnings which their members could make. These members could
still produce as much as they wished, but if they sought immediate
pay for production in excess of the established ceilings, they subjected
46 Id. at 424.
47 Id. at 428-29 (concurring opinion).
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themselves to fines ranging as high as one hundred dollars for each
offense. 48 Instead of reporting their total output and subjecting them-
selves to fines, union members had the option of "banking" all produc-
tion above their quotas, with the right to draw upon this overage
wherever their production fell below the maximum limits allowed
under the ceiling.
The company conceded that the ceiling had been the subject of
bargaining and that it had cooperated over the years in the union's
policing of the rule by making its books available for inspection, pay-
ing union stewards for time spent engaged in checking compliance and
banking earnings in conformity with the rule itself. The company
argued, however, that the contract made no mention of the ceiling, its
administration or enforcement, and that it had at all times refused
to recognize any limitation of the amount an individual could earn,
paying each employee the full amount that their production report
warranted.
In February 1961, the union discovered that certain employees
had accepted pay in excess of that permitted by the ceiling. As in Allis-
Chalmers, these members were tried and convicted on charges of con-
duct unbecoming a union member and fined. Several refused to pay the
fines and were sued in a Wisconsin state court.49 Thereupon, these
members filed charges with the NLRB. A complaint issued, which the
Board, agreeing with the trial examiner, subsequently dismissed 5 0 The
Board's majority, with little discussion of the legitimacy of the produc-
tion ceiling rule or its relationship to the bargaining process, held that
8(b)(1)(A) had never been intended to reach a union's enforcement of
a production ceiling rule. Even without regard to the proviso, the Board
concluded that 8(b)(l)(A) was inapplicable to court enforcement of
internal union rules of this nature, since it was obvious that this type
of conduct did not fall within the intendment of the statute.
Logically, this should have ended the majority's inquiry. They felt
constrained, however, to refute the dissenter's literal interpretation of
48 The penalties contained in a February 1961 union by-law provided that any mem-
ber violating the production ceiling is "guilty of conduct unbecoming a union member
and subject to a fine of $1.00 for each violation." The by-law also provided that in case of
persistent ceiling violations, the offender would be charged with "conduct unbecoming a
union member." If a member were found guilty of such conduct, he could be assessed with
a maximum fine of one hundred dollars (enforceable within a specified time by automatic
suspension or expulsion) or suspended or expelled from membership.
49 Six members were fined in all; two at the sum of thirty-five dollars, which they paid.
The remaining members, whose fines ranged from fifty to one hundred dollars each, re-
fused to pay. Consequently, the union filed suit for collection in the Civil Court of Mil-
waukee County, Wisconsin.
50 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
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the proviso.51 The proviso, they continued, specifically protected the
unions' right to enact rules affecting the membership status of their
members, though it conferred no right to affect their employment
status. Fines for disobeying union rules did not interfere with the lat-
ter, and hence, even had they been initially subject to 8(b)(1)(A), would
have been excepted by its proviso.
There was considerable delay before the Board's decision was re-
viewed by the Seventh Circuit.52 In the meantime, the Supreme Court
had issued its Allis-Chalmers decision, overturning the Seventh Circuit's
literal interpretation of 8(b)(1)(A). On the basis of this decision, which
the court now termed "the authoritative construction" of the statute,
the production quota fines were upheld.53 By a 7-1 vote, the Supreme
Court vindicated the Seventh Circuit's reliance. 54
Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, emphasized the dis-
tinction between internal and external means of enforcement. Internal
means, which include disciplinary measures not jeopardizing members'
employment status, are with few exceptions beyond the pale of 8(b)
(1)(A); whereas external means, which affect a member's job status,
contravene section 8(b)(1)(A) and several other sections besides. 55 This
51 The Board adhered to the distinction they had drawn in Allis-Chalmers, i.e., be-
tween rules which affect employees as union members and those which affect them as
employees. Obviously, they declared, production and wages were related to employment,
but this did not alter the fact that the fines were imposed on the employees as union mem-
bers and not as employees. They went on to conclude that the Board was not "empowered"
by Congress to police a union decision concerning a member's good standing or lack of
same. Moreover, they could not pass judgment on the penalties a union may impose on a
member as long as the penalty does not impair the member's status as an employee. Id. at
1104.
However, dissenting Member Leedom narrowly interpreted the proviso to except
"from the ambit of § 8(b)(1)(A) only such restraint or coercion that results from a union's
application of its rules relating to 'the acquisition or retention of membership.'" Conse-
quently, fines for exceeding production involved more than strictly an internal union
matter.
But even assuming that the proviso has a broader reach than I would ascribe to
it, I would still disagree that the matter here involved is one that is merely a
matter of internal union regulation. Employees may occupy a dual status: first,
is their status as employees; second is their status as union members. Those mat-
ters affecting employees as union members may appropriately be referred to as
internal union affairs. Those matters which affect employees as employees are not
internal union affairs. Of course, it is quite possible that some matters may affect
both the employment relationship and the membership relationship, but to the
extent they involve the former, they are not internal union affairs.
Id. at 1111.
52 Before the Seventh Circuit reached the substantive issues, the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari with regard to the procedural question of whether charging parties had
the right to appeal adverse decisions of the NLRB. The Court eventually held that they
did and the case therefore reached the circuit court on the charging party's petition for
review. 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
58 393 F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1968).
54394 U.S. 423 (1969).
55 Id. at 428-29.
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was a distinction, the Court noted, that the Board had drawn as early
as 1954,r6 and this dichotomy was reinforced by the passage of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, wherein Congress, although specifically address-
ing itself to internal union regulation, deliberately refused to alter
this long-standing policy regarding union discipline. The majority has-
tened to add that in certain cases where union rules thwart vital labor
law policy, as in Shipbuilding Workers, their enforcement will be sub-
ject to attack as an unfair labor practice, even if internally enforced. 7
Therefore, under what the majority termed "this dual approach,"
unions remain free to enforce by reasonable methods legitimate rules
properly adopted, as long as they flaunt no congressional labor policy
and are applied to voluntary union members. 8 The UAW's production
ceiling rules, the Court concluded, met these standards.
In enacting the rule limiting production, the Court noted that the
union was merely following traditional labor union policy of opposing
incentive pay systems as a menace to the workingman. It was recog-
nized that historically unions had fought such systems as a disguised
wage depressant which generated competitive pressures and animosities
among employees working under it. Manifestly, then, limiting the
effectiveness of incentive programs was well within the union's legiti-
mate sphere of interest. Moreover, in implementing its attack on the
company's incentive program, the union had not circumvented the
bargaining process, as the petitioner claimed, but had acted consistently
with it. In this, the Court accepted the Board's findings that the ceiling
rule had been the subject of bargaining between the parties and had
survived all the company's attempts to have it eliminated. In the final
analysis, there could be discerned "no basis in the statutory policy en-
couraging collective bargaining for giving the employer a better bar-
gain than he has been able to strike at the bargaining table." 9 For
these reasons, the Court concluded that the production quota rule was
not contrary to basic labor policy and, consequently, its enforcement
by a reasonable fine did not violate the statute.6 0
56 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
57Although the Board's construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) emphasized the sanc-
tion imposed rather than the rule itself, the Court observed that even the Board has
made it clear that "if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws
the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating § 8(b)(1)." In
support of its position, the Court cited both the Skura and Shipbuilding Workers decisions.
394 U.S. at 429-30.
581d. at 430.
5old. at 433.
60 Id. at 436.
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THE NEW TRILOGY: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS
Generalizations about union discipline and its relation to 8(b)-
(1)(A) are easy to formulate. Particularizing, as the cases bear out, is
much more difficult. As a starting point, the Supreme Court appears
to have put to rest, for the time being at least, the literal approach to
the statute espoused by both the Seventh Circuit and its own dissenters
in Allis-Chalmers. As each of the Court's three opinions make clear,
disciplinary fines, even when enforced by judicial rather than internal
union means, such as expulsion, are not in themselves necessarily coer-
cive, as that term is used in 8(b)(1)(A). Only by examining union
discipline as administered in each case and the objective behind its
enforcement can such a determination be made. Thus, the Court has
flatly rejected any literal approach which would automatically have
equated judicially enforced fines with economic coercion. In retrospect,
this result is hardly surprising, considering the Court's traditional
reluctance to follow "mechanistic approaches" to labor legislation.61 In
place of a literal approach to the statute, the Court substituted a
graduated one, borrowing the "dual approach" previously followed by
the Board and adding new criteria of its own.
Legitimacy of the Means Employed
The threshold question posed by the trilogy is now the same one
traditionally asked by the Board: was the discipline in question directed
at the employment status of the union members on whom it was im-
posed? If so, then further inquiry becomes unnecessary, for any such
action plainly violates not only 8(b)(1)(A), but in all probability sec-
tions 8(b)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(3) of the Act as well.62 If the penalty, how-
ever, does not entail loss of employment rights, then at least with
respect to the means of enforcement, the discipline cannot be said to
violate the Act.
As the Court indicated in Scofield, this basically is the same ap-
proach the Board has followed for the past sixteen years, since its 1954
decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.63 In that case, the Board
held that, while it was an unfair labor practice for a union to secure an
employee's discharge or to have his seniority reduced for failure to per-
61 See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v.
Local 760, Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S.
46 (1964).
62 These sections, according to Scofield, "form a web of which § 8(b)(1)(A) is only a
strand, preventing the union from inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the
job to enforce the union's rules." 394 U.S. at 429.
63 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
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form picket duty during a strike, the imposition of a five hundred
dollar fine for the same reason was not. The latter, according to the
Board, was protected by 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, which recognized the right
of labor organizations to make their own rules regarding "acquisition
or retention of membership." 64
Accordingly, distinguishing between disciplinary measures that
affect employment rights and those that do not is a highly critical deter-
mination in the Court's, as well as the Board's analysis. The test, as
enunciated by the Court in Scofield, is not whether the disciplinary
measures have an impact which surpasses the bounds of strict employee-
union relationship, but whether the union has reached beyond the
means at its disposal to enforce the rules, and has induced the employer
"to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's rules. '65
Simply stated, this means that where a union relies on its own internal
resources in disciplining rule violators, including the commencement
of a law suit, 8(b)(1)(A) is not violated, at least from the standpoint of
enforcement. 6 Conversely, however, if employer assistance is sought
as a means of depriving members of their job rights, employee section
7 rights are violated.
It is not clear, however, in light of the recent decision in Black-
hawk Tanning Co.,87 whether the Board would concur in the absolute-
ness of the foregoing dichotomy. In that case, the Board held that,
although expulsion of a union member for filing or circulating a de-
certification petition would be upheld against an 8(b)(l)(A) challenge,
fining a member for engaging in the same conduct would not. In ar-
riving at its conclusion, the Board stated that it would not be bound
by "routine application of a formula: if expulsion is lawful so is a fine,
or if expulsion is unlawful so is a fine."6 It went on to conclude that
there is a qualitative difference between an expulsion and a fine, the
former being said to be purely defensive in the decertification context,
while the latter was termed punitive, having the effect of discouraging
members from seeking access to the Board's processes. Thus, despite the
64Id. at 728.
65 394 U.S. at 429.
66 The Court specifically recognized in Scofield that a union rule relating to produc-
tion affects the interests of all three participants in the labor-management relationship:
employer, employee and union. It further recognized that, although this rule was enforced
by what it termed internal means, the rule and its enforcement were dearly intended to
have an effect beyond the confines of the union organization. Nonetheless, since it violated
no statutory labor policy and since the employer's assistance in enforcement was not util-
ized, neither the rule nor its enforcement violated 8(b)(1)(A).
67 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1044 (Aug. 25, 1969); cf. Smith-Lee Co., 182
N.L.R.B. No. 129, 74 L.R.R.M. 1201 (May 27, 1970).
65 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 at 3, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
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fact that fines involve only internal means of enforcement and Mr.
Justice White's intimation in Allis-Chalmers that the more severe
penalty of expulsion included the lesser penalty of fines, the Board
felt that these two different types of penalties required different results
when aligned against 8(b)(1)(A) in a decertification context.
Thus, the upshot of this new trilogy is that, with the possible ex-
ception of the Blackhawk Tanning Co. situation, judicial enforcement
of union fines are now afforded the same protection as expulsion or
threats of expulsion, the more traditional means of union discipline.
Consequently, the dilemma which had formerly confronted many
unions, i.e., having either to expel members to obtain compliance with
union rules or to tolerate insubordination, may well be eliminated.
Legitimacy of Union Rules as Enforced
Although judicial enforcement of fines as a means of fostering
obedience to internal union regulations received Supreme Court ap-
proval in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, the Court was quick to
caution that the mode of enforcement was only one of the criteria bear-
ing on the legitimacy of union discipline under 8(b)(1)(A). As the Court
stressed in Shipbuilding Workers, even where discipline is enforced
purely by internal means, such as expulsion, an unfair labor practice
may still lie if the rule being enforced conflicts with other deep-seated
federal labor policies or impinges on the protected third-party rights.6 9
Again, the Court was merely following the lead of the Board, whose
earlier decisions had recognized the possibility of such a conflict and
ruled accordingly.70
The question of whether or not a particular union rule is contrary
to national labor policy or conflicts with recognized third-party inter-
ests is not always an easy one, and like so many other questions under
the Taft-Hartley Act, the answer can only be arrived at by weighing
the competing objectives. If the policy reasons in opposition to enforce-
ment of the rule are strong, and the need for the rule less than con-
vincing, then its enforcement, in all likelihood, will be proscribed.
Conversely, if policies with which the union regulation is said to con-
flict are of no great import, while the rule's enforcement goes to the
core of effective collective action, as the Court thought it did in Allis-
Chalmers, the chances of the rule being upheld are much improved.
69 388 U.S. at 202.
70 See, e.g., Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966); see also National Tea
Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 73 L.R.R.M. 1529 (Mar. 27, 1970) wherein the Board recently
reaffirmed its Shipbuilding Workers rationale.
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In short, courts confronted with questions of this nature must at-
tempt to reconcile the conflicting public and union policies in issue in
an attempt to reach a proper accommodation. A brief review of the cases
confirms this procedure and, at the same time, points out the fine dis-
tinctions which the Board and reviewing courts often draw in this area.
In Allis-Chalmers, for instance, the Court quoted Professor Sum-
mers71 for the proposition that "[t]he power to fine or expel strike-
breakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining
agent."7 2 Depriving unions of this right, according to the Court, would
"impair the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon" and would
consequently deprive unions of the powers necessary to properly fulfill
their roles as exclusive bargaining agents.73 Against these compelling
reasons in support of having unions invested with authority to fine
strikebreakers, the Court could point to no countervailing policy of
the Act. Hence, the balance under these circumstances was clearly in
favor of union exercise of this power.
Likewise, in Scofield, the Court found the union rule in question
to be in keeping with legimate trade union objectives. It was observed
that unions had historically fought against incentive systems for the
reason that productivity increases resulting therefrom exert new pres-
sures on employers to drive down the piecework rate. Such a pro-
cess, the unions successfully argued, only triggered new cycles of
increased productivity at lower piece rates, while engendering competi-
tive pressures which endanger employees' health and exploit their
jealousies. For these reasons, the Court concluded, the production
limitations served to promote a valid trade union purpose.
Just as important to the Court was the fact that the institution
of these production quotas, and their subsequent enforcement against
union members, was not accomplished at the expense of undermining
policies fostered by the Act. Contrary to the petitioner's contention,
the Court found that the union's adoption of the quota system did not
circumvent the bargaining process. These ceilings had been the subject
of bargaining for many years and the company had always been un-
successful in its attempts to have the quotas eliminated. Thus, it could
hardly be said that the fines or their court enforcement infringed on
the bargaining process. Again, the balance was dearly in favor of up-
holding the union rule.
Distinguishable from Scofield is the Ninth Circuit case of Associ-
71 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAnv. L. RP,. 1049 (1951).
72 388 U.S. at 181, quoting Summers, supra note 71, at 1049.
73 Id.
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ated Home Builders v. NLRB,7 4 wherein union members had also
been fined for exceeding union production quotas. Unlike Scofield,
however, the evidence before the court suggested that the quotas had
been unilaterally imposed by the union. If this were true, the court
observed, then the union was guilty of an 8(b)(3) refusal to bargain,
since production rules were obviously "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" and, hence, involved mandatory subjects of bargaining. There-
fore, the case was remanded to the Board for further findings consistent
with the union's apparent failure to bargain in good faith. In this case,
therefore, unlike Scofield, the method of establishing the production
ceilings clashed with existing countervailing statutory requirements
and could not be upheld.
In Shipbuilding Workers, the Court struck down a rule which was
admittedly adopted in pursuit of a legitimate union objective. None-
theless, the union objectives were outweighed in the Court's equation
by the more important consideration of insuring unrestricted access to
the NLRB. Any rule which would require employees to forego the
Board's assistance, even temporarily, the Court held, must be struck
down as interfering with the congressionally approved method for
regulating union-management activities. Hence, in the Court's view,
any procedure involving prior exhaustion of union remedies, even
through purely internal means such as expulsion, contravened para-
mount public policy considerations and hence violated 8(b)(1)(A).
In reaching this result, the Court was again following earlier Board
precedent. 5
Determining exactly where national labor policy lies in a given
case, however, is sometimes a formidable undertaking. A closer look
at Shipbuilding Workers illustrates this point. In that case, the policy
of allowing unions a reasonable amount of time to first rule on com-
plaints from their members seemingly found statutory support in the
Landrum-Griffin Act. Section 101(A)(4), specifically limiting restric-
tions that unions may place on their members' right to resort to federal
and state agencies, contains the following proviso: "Provided that any
such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing pro-
cedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such
organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
.. ."7T Since the body of section 101(A)(4) is itself directed to unions,
it was only logical to conclude that the language of the proviso likewise
74 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
75 See cases cited at note 70 supra.
7629 US.C. § 411(a)(4) (1964).
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pertained to them, and, consequently, that unions had the recognized
right to require their members to exhaust union procedures for four
months before resorting to the Board or the courts and to be in a
position to impose reasonable penalties for their failure to do so.
Indeed, this was precisely the interpretation which the Seventh Circuit
adopted. 7
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, interpreting the pro-
viso as strictly a rule of judicial administration, allowing courts in their
discretion to refrain from entertaining suits by members against their
unions for up to a four-month period pending exhaustion of internal
union remedies. It was not, the Court maintained, a rule pertaining
to union discipline which would impliedly allow unions to punish
members who had not observed the four-month exhaustion period.78
As one writer has stated, this construction of the proviso as an
independent substantive provision ignores the elementary rule of statu-
tory construction that a proviso only qualifies and relates to the sub-
stantive provision to which it is attached.7 9 Since the body of 101(A)(4)
is directed at union conduct, it is not only faulty construction, but
illogical as well to make the proviso applicable to the courts, rather
than unions. This criticism of the Court's construction is, if anything,
augmented by the legislative history which on balance supports the
Seventh Circuit's position that the proviso allows unions, under threat
of discipline, to require its members to exhaust internal remedies for
at least four months before filing court actions or unfair labor practice
charges. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by its construction of this
proviso, has relegated this aspect of public policy to a position inferior
to that of "free access," thereby making it clear that the latter is re-
garded as the more crucial policy. In any event, the accommodation of
these conflicting goals was not the simple process which a casual reading
of the Supreme Court's opinion might suggest.
The difficulties inherent in fixing boundary lines between con-
flicting labor policies are again dramatized in the Board's Tawas Tube
Products, Inc.80 and the Ninth Circuit's Price v. NLRB81 decisions.
77 Other cases have either explicitly or implicitly approved of this interpretation. See
McGraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965); Detroy v. American
Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961); Mamula v. Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294,
200 A.2d 806 (1964).
78 In support of this interpretation, the Court looked to the legislative history of the
section but was forced to concede that it "was not very illuminating." 891 U.S. at 427.
79 See O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue Under the Landrum-
Griffin Act, 14 CArH. U.L. Rav. 215 (1965).
80 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
81373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
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Both cases bear a marked resemblance to Shipbuilding Workers, but,
in both instances, the latter was distinguished. In both Tawas Tube
and Price, union members were deprived of their membership status
as a result of having filed petitions to decertify their respective unions.82
Since the disciplined members' job rights remained intact, the pen-
alties in both cases were upheld as falling within the protection of
8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso. Shipbuilding Workers was distinguished on the
ground that decertification petitions, not unfair labor practice charges,
were involved. Unlike an unfair labor practice charge, reasoned both
the Board and the Ninth Circuit, a decertification petition does not
charge the union with having violated its statutory obligations. There-
fore, a member who is disciplined for filing a "decert" petition is not
being punished for attempting to force his union to adhere to its legal
requirements, but rather for attacking its very existence. Moreover,
unless the union could expel such a member, "during the pre-election
campaign, the member could campaign against the union while re-
maining a member and therefore privy to the union's strategy and
and tactics. "8 3 Surely, both tribunals concluded, the proviso at least
permits unions to suspend or expel members who seek to bring about
their very destruction.
In neither of these decisions, however, was more than passing
reference made to one of the NLRA's basic underlying policies, i.e.,
granting employees a free and unrestrained choice in selecting their
bargaining representatives. Nor was any mention made of the poten-
tial deterrent such discipline might have on members who might other-
wise consider putting the question of a change in bargaining agents
to the election test. In light of the Board's professed concern for in-
suring employee freedom of choice in election matters, this omission
is particularly surprising.84 Similarly, neither the Board nor the Ninth
Circuit made any attempt to reconcile the fact that an 8(a)(2) unfair
labor practice charge may well have the same potentially disastrous
consequences for a recognized union as a decertification petition.
Compounding the confusion that has resulted from the rigid dis-
tinctions that have been drawn between the Shipbuilding Workers
situation and that in Tawas Tube and Price is Blackhawk Tanning
82 In Tawas Tube, the member was expelled, whereas in Price the discipline con-
sisted of a five-year suspension from membership.
88 373 F.2d at 447.
84 See Booster Lodge No. 405, Case No. 15-CB-779, TXD-737-68 (Dec. 80, 1968);
Communications Workers of Am. Local 5550, Case No. 30-CB-250, TXD-616-69 (Nov. 18,
1969); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75
L.R.R.M. 1438 (Dec. 3, 1970).
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Co.8 5 In Blackhawk, the Board characterized the rule permitting a
union to expel a member seeking its decertification as "an exception
to the rule prohibiting a union from penalizing a union member be-
cause he has sought to invoke the Board's processes."86 In the Board's
words, such an exception was based on "the necessities of the situation,
the right of the union to defend itself,"87 whereas when a union fines
a member because of his decertification efforts, it is no longer merely
aiming to protect itself, but is actively engaged in thwarting access
to the Board's processes. In truth, however, this rationale for distin-
guishing between fines and expulsion would appear to rest on a faulty
premise. How many members who file decertification petitions against
their incumbent union would, in reality, remain "privy to the union's
strategy and tactics"88 during the course of the ensuing election cam-
paign? Moreover, if, as the Board indicates, "the deterrent or punitive
effect of expulsion in such circumstances is at most minimal,"8 9 why
should a union not be in a position to resort to stronger punitive
measures, as Allis-Chalmers suggests? At any rate, the Board's approach
in Blackhawk seems, as the dissenters point out, a clear departure from
positions adopted by the Supreme Court and its own earlier decisions,
and creates a distinction between fines and expulsion for 8(b)(1)(A)
purposes where none previously existed.90
These remarks are not meant to suggest that the results reached
in these two cases are necessarily wrong, but only to emphasize that
enforcement of legitimate trade union rules often begets conflicts with
other policies traditionally fostered by our existing labor laws. The
cases give ample testimony to the elusiveness of national labor policy
and problems inherent in making it a standard by which to gauge the
legitimacy of union rules. Broad general policies in this field often
come into conflict when carried beyond the bounds of their original
application. Each case must be evaluated individually, with the ulti-
mate solution calling for "discrimination, the weighing of the public
policy in each situation against the union's right to regulate its internal
affairs." 91
85 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1044 (Aug. 25, 1969). See text accompanying note
67 supra.
86 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 at 3, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
87 Id.
88 373 F.2d at 447.
89 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 at 3, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
90 See the Scofield opinions at both the Supreme Court and NLRB levels, 394 US. 423
(1969), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1101 (1964); and the Allis-Chalmers decision, 388 U.S. 175, 188,
198 (1967); see also Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966).
91 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 at 3, 72 L.R.M. at 1050.
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Unresolved Questions
In addition to the two-pronged test of union discipline, i.e., in-
ternal means of enforcement and legitimacy of object, both Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield refer to other criteria which may have a bearing
on the question of whether particular applications of discipline run
afoul of the strictures of 8(b)(1)(A). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court em-
phasized that the UAW strike was lawful, had received prior approval
by the membership in accordance with the union's constitution, and
that the members on whom the fines were levied were full-fledged,
oath-taking members who had been fairly tried and convicted. The
presence of these factors was also cited in Scofield. Therefore, in neither
decision was it necessary for the Court to speculate on what effect, if
any, the absence of one or more of these criteria might have had on
their respective outcomes.
Shortly after Allis-Chalmers was decided, Arnold Ordman, the
General Counsel of the Board, indicated that
in order to obtain clarification of this gray area of labor relations,
[he intended] to submit for Board and Court adjudication not only
questions relating to the legality of fines imposed upon employees
with less than full union membership and fines for failure to sup-
port unprotected or unlawful strikes and picketing, but even cases
where the issue turned on the alleged excessiveness of the fines.9 2
The number of charges that have issued since this intention was ex-
pressed indicates that the General Counsel has remained true to his
word.93
Reasonableness of the Fine
By far, the largest number of 8(b)(1)(A) post-trilogy cases have
focused on the question of whether the imposition and court collection
of an unreasonably excessive fine constitutes an unfair labor practice,
and if so, determining the criteria on which "reasonableness" deter-
minations should be based. Most NLRB trial examiners assumed, in
light of the new trilogy, that fines unreasonable in amount involved
92 NLRB, QUARTERLY REP. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, in BNA LAB. REL. YEARBooK 290
(1968).
93 See, e.g., Lodge 598, Int'l Ass'n Machinists, AFL-CIO (Union Carbide Corp.), 186
N.L.R.B. No. 138, 75 L.R.R.M. 1456 (Dec. 3, 1970); Local 205, Lithographers Intl Union,
AFL-CIO (General Gravure Serv. Co., Inc.), 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 75 L.R.R.M. 1856
(Nov. 9, 1970); Milwaukee Printing Pressmen & Assistant Union No. 7, Case No.
30-CB-288, TXD-187-70 (Apr. 2, 1970); Local 488, UAW (General Motors Corp.), Case
No. 7-CB-1712, TXD-494-68 (1968).
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the kind of coercion proscribed by the statute. Under this supposition,
they went on to analyze the various factors which would, in their
estimation, be pertinent in determining whether a given fine would
exceed the bounds of "reasonableness." Included among the many
factors alluded to in their discussions were the disciplined member's
normal earnings, his earnings during the strike, his regular union dues
and initiation fees, and contract gains won as a result of the strike.
It was only recently, in Arrow Development Co.,94 that the Board
ruled directly on the question of whether the reasonableness of the
fine is a relevant consideration in an unfair labor practice charge.
After reviewing earlier Board decisions in the area of union discipline,
the majority of the Board95 concurred with the respondent's conten-
tions and those advanced by the unions filing amicus briefs, 6 and held
that fines, no matter how large, for crossing a legitimate picket line
affect only membership status, thereby constituting internal union ac-
tion not subject to Board regulation. Consequently, the Board majority
declared that the dollar volume amount of the fine and its reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness were internal union matters, which, by virtue
of the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A), the Board was prohibited from examining.
As for the Supreme Court's admonitions against unreasonable fines,
raised so frequently in Allis-Chalmers and reasserted in Scofield, the
Board concluded that they were "directed to enforcing courts, encour-
aging those courts to make an independent determination of the rea-
sonableness of the fine in each case presented."97 Accordingly, the
majority concluded that "as the legal enforceability of these fines is
grounded in the contract theory," it was "obvious that the local courts
are the more logical tribunals for the establishment of standards of rea-
sonableness.""" The majority ruled, therefore, that the determination of
the reasonableness was strictly the domain of the enforcing courts, not
the NLRB.
Former Board Chairman McCulloch disagreed; rather than sug-
gesting the conclusion reached by the majority, the Supreme Court cases
indicated to him that, had the fines in those cases been unreasonable in
amount, the Court would have found a statutory violation. 9 Member
McCulloch found that
94 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (Aug. 27, 1970).
95 The decision was by a 3-1 vote, with Members Fanning, Browm and Jenkins in the
majority, and Member McCulloch dissenting. Chairman Miller did not participate in the
decision.
96 Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the AFL-CIO, Teamsters and the UAW.
97 185 N.LR.B. No. 22 at 7, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
9SId.
99 Id. at 9, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
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[i]mplidt in the Court's analysis of this aspect of National labor
policy is the concept that a union has a legitimate interest in im-
posing reasonable discipline upon a voluntary member if needed
to protect its status as an institution for effective bargaining, even
though such discipline also serves to restrain and coerce the mem-
ber's exercise of his Section 7 right to refrain from engaging in
concerted activities. The corollary is that where otherwise lawful
discipline oversteps reasonable bounds of needed protection and
becomes essentially punitive in nature, it impairs federal labor
policy. And since no legitimate union interest is then served, it
remains within the compass of Section 8(b)(1)(A).100
In this case, he observed that the fine imposed exceeded the net
wages earned during the strike, and, therefore, in reality served as
"a total restraint on the right to refrain from engaging in the concerted
activity, different in form but in economic reality the same as if they
had been blocked at the plant gate by unlawful violence or a mass
picket line."'101 Moreover, levying a fine that exceeded strike wages
was, in McCulloch's opinion, tantamount to the union's causing the
employer to suspend the disciplined employees for a brief period after
the strike because they had worked during it. Clearly, such action
would have violated 8(b)(1)(A), and there was no apparent reason why
a fine in excess of strike wages should be treated differently.
In any event, the Board has now ruled that the Act does not allow
it "to evaluate the fairness of the union discipline meted out to pro-
tect a legitimate union interest."'102 It will be interesting to see if the
courts of appeals concur in upholding the limited authority which the
Board has staked out for itself in this area.
Necessity for Prior Warning that Fines Will Be Levied
Several trial examiners have ruled that, before a fine may be
validly assessed, the union organization involved must first have ex-
plicitly warned its members that the conduct in issue would render
them liable to fine.'03 In these cases, both due process and elemental
fairness were cited as requiring that members be advised that fines
will be imposed on those who continue to work during a strike. One
100 Id.
01 Id. at 14, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1013.
102 Id. at 8, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1011. Two recent cases following the Arrow Development
Co. decision are Local 488, UAW (Edward J. Hohmann), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 75 L.R.R.M.
1242 (Oct. 9, 1970); Communications Workers of Am., Local 6222, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 75
LR.R.M. 1324 (Oct. 81, 1970).
103 See, e.g., Booster Lodge No. 405, Case No. 15-CB-779, TXD -737-68 (Dec. 30, 1968);
Communications Workers of Am. Local 5550, Case No. 30-CB-250, TXD-616-69 (Nov. 18,
1969); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75
L.R.R.M. 1438 (Dec. 3, 1970).
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examiner has further suggested that members should also be informed
of the approximate limits of the fines, so that they may "determine
whether their family obligations would warrant their continued earn-
ing of a salary notwithstanding the threatened fine, or whether the
fine might not dissipate all or most of the earnings - or, even worse,
... exceed the earnings."'104 Thus far, however, the Board has not yet
had occasion to rule on whether a prior warning is a concomitant
requirement for union enforcement of fines against derelict mem-
bers. In light of Arrow Development Co., however, it is unlikely that
the Board will attempt to superimpose such a requirement on internal
union procedures.
Arbitrary Imposition of Fines
Another question still unresolved is "whether 8(b)(1)(A) pro-
scribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience
of a [union leader's fiat]?"'1 5 Prior to the decision in Miranda Fuel
Co.,106 it would have been difficult to respond affirmatively to this
question, since unfair, discriminatory and invidious treatment at the
hands of one's bargaining representative was not at that time con-
sidered an unfair labor practice. With the advent of Miranda, however,
irregularities in the adoption of union rules or deficiencies in their
application and enforcement may well constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice. Indeed, Miranda itself involved what the Board termed "nothing
more than an arbitrary imposition of an ex post facto rule."'' 7
The precise boundaries of the fair representation duty, however,
have not yet crystallized, and it may be that the Board and courts
will stop well short of making all arbitrary union conduct and undemo-
cratic practices unfair labor practices under the fair representation
rationale. Even if this be the case, it is possible that such conduct
may still constitute an unfair labor practice under the Shipbuild-
ing Workers theory. Sections of the Landrum-Griffin Act 08 enumerate
specific guarantees of due process and proscribe certain arbitrary and
undemocratic union practices. Union conduct which flaunts these pro-
tections would, ipso facto, defy established national labor law policy
and, hence, under the Shipbuilding Workers approach, violate 8(b)-
(1)(A).
104 Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75
L.R.R.M. 1438 (Dec. 3, 1970).
105 388 U.S. at 195.
106 See notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra.
107 140 N.L.R.B. at 184.
108 § l0l(a)(1) et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) et seq. (1964).
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As a policy matter, however, neither of the above arguments
justifies the use of 8(b)(1)(A) as a vehicle for correcting internal union
abuses. Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act'0 9 was passed precisely for
the purpose of making internal union procedures comport with due
process and overall fairness. Congress certainly would not have gone
to the trouble of enacting a major piece of labor legislation to remedy
internal union abuses if protection were already available more quickly
and less expensively through the NLRB. Moreover, title I furnishes
specific guidelines for determining whether the union action meets
the minimal standards set by Congress, and a body of case law is al-
ready in the process of bringing these safeguards more clearly into
focus.
In Lodge 455, International Brotherhood of Boilmakers v. Terry, °0
the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of five hundred dollars damage to
union members who had been disciplined by their union for crossing
its picket line."" The court held that the union's failure to comply
with its constitutional requirement that a strike vote be held prior to
the calling of a strike or work stoppage resulted in a loss of its right
to discipline members who refused to obey the strike call. Moreover,
in disciplining members under these circumstances, the union violated
its own bill of rights and subjected itself to suit under the provisions
of the Landrum-Griffin Act." 2
As previously indicated, however, the wisdom of treating union con-
duct similar to that in Terry as an unfair labor practice would be
questionable. The discipline involved in such cases is purely of an
internal union nature. Under the reasoning of the new trilogy and
Arrow Development Co., it should therefore be treated as strictly an
internal union affair, albeit one in which the union has exceeded the
bounds of its authority. Indeed, it was precisely to remedy internal
union abuses of this nature that the Landrum-Griffin Act was passed,
and this congressional effort to define union obligations toward their
members would be seriously eroded if the vague and ambiguous lan-
guage of 8(b)(1)(A) now were to become the barometer of union fair
play and due process. For these reasons, it is submitted that the
Landrum-Griffin Act, rather than the NLRA, should be the sole means
109 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
110 398 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1968).
111 One member was fined twenty-five dollars; others received a flat fine of one hun-
dred dollars plus twenty-five dollars for each week they continued to work for the picketed
concern.
11229 US.C. §§ 411(a)(5) & 412.
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by which improperly adopted or imposed union rules are legally sub-
ject to challenge.
UNION MVEMBERSHIP
Types of Union Membership
In both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, the Court specifically noted
that its decisions were limited to cases where the discipline was levied
against full-fledged union members who had voluntarily elected to be-
come union members in fact as well as name. Unanswered was the
question of whether so-called "financial core" members, whose union
participation was limited to paying uniform dues and fees required
by a union security agreement, could be subjected to fines for infrac-
tions of union rules without violating 8(b)(l)(A)." 3
The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between voluntary
members and mere dues payers has been criticized on the ground
that most employees are unaware of the option to limit their union
affiliation to the financial aspects of membership.114 As a practical
matter, it has been pointed out, employees obligated to join a union
under a union security clause are seldom informed of their right
to refrain from accepting formal union membership. These observa-
tions, however valid, may prove academic if it is subsequently deter-
mined that "financial core" members are as susceptible to union
discipline as other members. In order to test this point, the Board's
General Counsel has recently issued a complaint alleging that a fine
assessed against a limited member violated 8(b)(l)(A).n5
In issuing this complaint, the General Counsel reasoned that
even though the collection of fines against a "financial core" member
might prove legally uncollectible because of the limited contractual
obligation assumed by such members, nonetheless, the imposition of
fines in such situations would effectively restrain those employees in
the exercise of statutorily protected rights in violation of 8(b)(1)(A).
This was so because a fine under such circumstances would force an
individual into the onerous position of having to undertake the de-
fense of a lawsuit if the union should attempt to collect through court
action.116
113 388 U.S. at 195.
114 See Comment, Judicial Enforcement of Union Disciplinary Fines, 76 YALE L.J. 563,
566-67 (1967).
115 See NLRB, QUARTERLY REP. OF THE Ga. COUNSEL, in BNA LAB. REL. YEnnooK
290 (1968).
116Id. Despite the fact that the General Counsel conceded that a fine against a
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Despite the force of these contentions, and the seemingly legal
pregnancy of the Supreme Court's distinction between full members
and mere dues payers, union opposition to treating "financial core"
members differently than full members is not without support. The
sole purpose of requiring employees under a union security arrange-
ment to contribute to the financial support of the union is to eliminate
free riders by making each unit employee bear his fair share of the
expenses of representation. Tolerating free riders, however, would be far
less of a burden for unions than forcing them to tolerate activity on the
part of mere dues payers, which undermines basic union goals and objec-
tives. Allowing nominal members to completely escape union sanction,
no matter how devastating their conduct from a union viewpoint, would
seriously impair a union's organizational effectiveness and severely
handicap it in accomplishing its fundamental objectives.
Again, neither the Board nor reviewing courts have as yet grappled
with the legal distinctions, if any there be, between "financial core"
members and full-fledged, oath-taking ones. When they do, however,
these tribunals will once again be confronted with the basic dilemma
posed by these 8(b)(1)(A) disciplinary cases, i.e., balancing the union's
need for effective control over its "membership" against the freedom
of individual employees to dissent from concerted collective action.
Resignation from Union Membership
Another question directly related to the issue of union member-
ship status is: can an employee by resigning his union membership
avoid the reach of union disciplinary measures? The Board has long
held that, in the absence of contrary by-law or constitutional pro-
visions, an employee joining a voluntary labor union for an indefinite
period may resign therefrom at will.117 It has further held that since
the relationship between a union member and his union is contractual,
an employee, by resigning, severs this contractual bond and thereby
removes the underlying basis for his financial obligation to the union."8
Both of these principles were reiterated in the Board's recent
"financial core member" might be uncollectible in a civil case, he claimed that the union-
"financial core member" relationship was not so dear as to render the fine an empty
gesture, particularly in view of the burden which a defense against a suit to collect might
entail. He also noted that a fine under such circumstances could not be classified as an
internal union matter and thus be protected under 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, since no union-
member relationship had been established voluntarily.
117 See Local 767. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, Case No. 9-CB-1726-3, TXD-351-70
(June 30, 1970); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1953).
118 See Local 621, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am.
(Atlantic Research Corp.), 167 N.L.R.B. 610 (1967).
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decision in The Boeing Co. 119 In that case, the Board reaffirmed the
concept that once an employee tenders an unequivocal resignation his
relationship with the union is thereby severed. Thereafter, such a "for-
mer member" is immune from union discipline, including fines for
all conduct occurring subsequent to the resignation. If, under such
circumstances, a union still persists in its attempt to impose and col-
lect fines, it commits an unfair labor practice, even though a fine against
a nonmember may not itself be legally enforceabk in court. 2 0
The Board went on to caution, however, that a union retains the
right to impose discipline for all conduct occurring during the period
of union membership, and that an employee's resignation from the
union does not serve to extinguish this right, regardless of the fact
that its exercise is deferred until after submission of the resignation in
question.121 As the Board observed, membership is the cornerstone upon
which the union's authority to discipline its members rests.
In joining a union, the individual member becomes a party to a
contract-constitution. Without waiving his Section 7 right to re-
frain from concerted activities, he consents to the possible imposi-
tion of union discipline upon his exercise of that right. But the
contract between the member and the union becomes a nullity
upon his resignation. Both the member's duty of fidelity to the
union and the union's corresponding right to discipline him for
breach of that duty are extinguished.122
ILLEGAL OR UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES
Obviously, not all picketing or strikes are lawful in nature. Unions,
nevertheless, have at their disposal the same disciplinary measures for
insuring membership solidarity behind these endeavors, as the UAW
locals had in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield. The question then arises
whether such disciplinary measures as fines are subject to attack under
8(b)(1)(A) when the underlying strike activity which they support is
119 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (Aug. 27, 1970).
120 This is so, the Board observed, because
the coercion lies in the calculated threat (which makes the argument that the
fines imposed were not collectible] besides the point.... Faced with the possibility
of action against him, the employee may well be, for practical purposes, im-
pelled to forego his statutory right not to honor the Union's picket line rather
than risk involvement in a lawsuit whose outcome he cannot predict. Or, should
he choose to take that risk, he will find it necessary to hire counsel whose services
he ordinarily would not require.
Id. at 4-5, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1005.
121 Id. at 9, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
122 Id. at 6, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1006. The Board has subsequently relied on this rationale
in several other cases. See Communications Workers, Local 2108, 136 N.L.R.B. No. 147,
75 L.R.R.M. 1441 (Dec. 8, 1970); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local -35,
186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1438 (Dec. 3, 1970).
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itself illegal. The significance of this question can be seen from three
recent Board cases.
In Weidman Metal Masters,123 three union members were fined
twenty-five dollars each for working behind a picket line which the
Board later determined was itself in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B). As
part of the 8(b)(4) remedy, the Board ordered the union to refund the
fines. Thus, the discipline in this case was successfully challenged and
restitution achieved by attacking the underlying legality of the strike,
rather than through an 8(b)(1)(A) attack. Had the latter charge been
filed, however, it would undoubtedly have achieved the same result,
as Member Brown intimates in his dissent.1 24
In National Grinding Wheel Co.,1 25 union fines were challenged
under 8(b)(1)(A). The union had imposed fines against members who
refused to participate in a strike called in violation of a no-strike
clause. The Board held that fines under these circumstances offend the
Act's policy of fostering adherence to collective bargaining agreements
and under the rationale of Charles S. Skura12 and Shipbuilding Work-
ers, lose all claim to legitimacy.
Likewise, in Glaziers Local 1162,127 the Board reaffirmed its posi-
tion that union fines supporting a strike that breaches a no-strike
agreement are violative of 8(b)(1)(A). Concurring with the trial ex-
aminer, the Board observed that the "public policy in favor of enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements outweighs the union's right
to discipline members for violating rules which were enforced to com-
pel participation in a strike in breach of contract."' 28
Under either of the above approaches, the underlying legality of
the strike is a factor of critical significance. Relief is available either
by attacking the illegality of the strike directly, as was accomplished
in Weidman, or by attacking the imposition of discipline under 8(b)-
(1)(A), as was the case in Grinding Wheel and Glaziers Local 1162. In
each of these cases, despite the internal character of their enforcement,
fines levied in support of an unlawful strike or picket line activity
were held to be in unlawful conflict with overriding national labor
policy.
These decisions do not reach the question of the fines' legality
where the strike itself is legal but has not been authorized by the
123 166 N.L.R.B. 17 (1967).
124Id. at 118.
125 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311 (June 13, 1969).
126 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). See notes 89-40 and accompanying text supra.
127 177 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 73 L.R.R.M. 1125 (June 80, 1969).
128 Id. at 18, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1125.
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membership. This question would appear to be closely related to the
arbitrary imposition of fines previously discussed.129 If strike authoriza-
tion were required by the union's constitution or by-laws, failure to
secure membership approval should provide an adequate defense to
a later union attempt to punish members for nonobservance. Such a
defense could be raised either during the union's disciplinary pro-
ceedings, a judicial appeal therefrom under the provisions of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, or in opposition to the fines' collection during
union enforcement proceedings, but, in any event, should not be
grounds for an 8(b)(1)(A) charge.
UNION DISCIPLINE AS A MANDATORY SUBJECT OF BARGAINING
Another question often raised in connection with union discipline
is whether such matters are mandatory subjects of bargaining. In light
of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, this question takes on added impor-
tance. If union fines and other disciplinary measures are held to be
mandatory subjects of bargaining, an employer could in effect neutral-
ize these weapons by conditioning any new labor contract following
an economic strike on the union's willingness to drop all disciplinary
action against members who refused to heed the strike call. Unions
quite conceivably might be willing to forego the use of discipline in
an effort to break the impasse, and, hence, the result reached in Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield might be effectively circumvented.
Thus far, however, unions have not been confronted with this
dilemma, since the Board has uniformly held that questions of union
discipline are matters of internal union business and not a mandatory
subject of bargaining.130 In the most recent case on the subject, the
Board has held that an employer's insistence that the union fines
against members who crossed its picket line be rescinded constituted
refusal to bargain and transformed the economic strike into an unfair
labor practice one? 31
FINES AGAINST SuPERvisoRs
A spate of recent Board decisions has made clear that whatever
the right of a union to fine its members who are in the bargaining unit,
different criteria must be applied when attempts are made to fine
129See notes 105-12 and accompanying text supra.
130 See, e.g., Gulf Refrigeration Inc., Case No. 12-CA-4218-2, TXD-662-68 (Nov. 19,
1968); Allen-Bradley Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 94 (1960), enforcement denied, 286 F.2d 422 (7th
Cir. 1961).
131 See UOP Norplex Div. of Universal Oil Prods. Co., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 72
L.R.R.M. 1475 (Nov. 21, 1969).
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supervisory personnel. In the majority of cases which have thus far
been considered, both the Board and its trial examiners have ruled
that such fines imposed on supervisory employees restrain or coerce
an employer in the selection of his bargaining representative in viola-
tion of 8(b)(1)(B). 18 2
In what is probably the leading case on the subject, union fines
imposed on foremen because their contract interpretation differed from
the union's were held to violate the statute. 133 Likewise, the Board
has held that fines against supervisors who performed unit work during
a strike violated 8(b)(1)(B) because the nub of the dispute was that
the supervisors' action violated the contract. In both of these cases, the
Board found that the fines were imposed as a result of the supervisors'
acting as spokesman on behalf of management, which, of course, is the
role of a supervisor. In A.S. Hor'ner, Inc.,134 however, the Board seem-
ingly went beyond the foregoing principle that a supervisor cannot be
fined by his union, at least when the discipline is designed to inhibit
his functioning as management's representative. In this case, the super-
visor in question was fined for having signed a letter endorsing the
company president's exhortation to employees to vote against the union
in the coming election. Although distinguishable from the other cases
in that the conduct for which the supervisor was fined was not directly
related to his supervisory duties, the Board held that, in essence, the
fine had been levied because the supervisor had placed the interests
of the company ahead of the union. Obviously, the Board declared,
such discipline was coercive "because it would tend to require the
Company to retain as representatives for collective bargaining and ad-
justment of grievances only individuals who were subservient to Re-
spondents [the union]."'18 5
Thus far, therefore, the Board has granted a wide immunity from
union discipline to supervisors and foremen on the theory that their
132 See, e.g., Meatcutters Union, Local 81 (Howard R. Hall), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 130,
75 L.R.R.M. 1247 (Oct. 6, 1970); IBEW, Local 134 (Illinois Bell Tel. Co.), Case No. 13-CB-
2890, TXD-378-70 (July ,3 1970); Houston Typographical Union No. 87 (Houston Shopping
News Co.), 182 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 74 L.R.R.M. 1170 (May 20, 1970); Dallas Mailers' Union
Local 143 (Dow Jones Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 73 L.R.R.M. 1360 (Feb. 25), enforced,
- F.2d - (10th Cir. 1970); Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 49 (General Metal
Prods.), 178 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 72 L.R.R.M. 1070 (Aug. 19, 1969); United Bhd. Carpenters
& Joiners of Am. (A.S. Homer Inc.), 176 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (June 18,
1969); Toledo Locals 15-P & 272, Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union (Toledo
Blade Co.), 175 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (May 19, 1969); cf. Local 453, Bhd. of
Painters (Syd Gough & Sons), 183 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 74 L.R.R.M. 1418 (June 26, 1970).
133 See San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18, Int'l Typographical Union
(Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N.L.R.B. No. 252, 68 L.R.R.M. 1397 (Sept. 23, 1968).
134 176 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 71 L.IRR.M. 1445 (June 18, 1969).
135 Id. at 4, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1446.
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primary allegiance is to management, and any discipline against such
"management representatives" would necessarily inhibit their freedom
to function in this capacity and would interfere with management's
selection and control over its own representatives.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Board has recently been called upon to determine when the
six-month statute of limitations under section 10(b) 136 begins to run
in union-fine cases. In Union Carbide Corp.,137 the Board at first held
that a complaint alleging "excessive union fines" was untimely because
it was filed more than six months after the union made its decision
to impose discipline. The Board, after recently voting to reconsider this
ruling, rejected the company's contention that the threat to collect fines
previously adjudged and to institute legal action for such purpose are
separate and independent illegal acts which start the limitation period
anew, and adhered to its original decision.138 Furthermore, the Board has
recently dismissed complaints as to fines which had become finalized
more than six months before charges were filed.13 9
CONCLUSION
The new trilogy and the Board cases following in its aftermath
deal with only one limited aspect of union discipline, i.e., whether its
imposition and enforcement in a given case constitute the commission
of an unfair labor practice. They do not purport to deal directly with
the legal enforceability of union disciplinary measures as such or
whether their imposition can be judicially challenged by the penalized
member. Nonetheless, they do touch upon a highly delicate and sensi-
tive area of labor relations law. As former Chairman McCulloch has
astutely observed, the real reason that these cases have now suddenly
become important is because "they are part of a new exploration of the
dichotomy between the rights of an exclusive bargaining agent, which
has been certified or recognized as the spokesman for all employees,
and the right of an individual worker to disagree with and act indepen-
dently of the bargaining agent and the group.140
This struggle between the unions' need for unity and cohesiveness
136 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
137 180 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 73 L.R.R.M. 1143 (Jan. 22, 1970).
188 186 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 75 L.R.R.M. 1456 (Dec. 3, 1970), supplementing 180 N.L.R.B.
No. 135, 73 L.R.R.M. 1371 (Feb. 20, 1970).
139 United Steelworkers, Local 1114, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 4, - L.R.R.M. -, (Dec. 10,
1970).
140 Address by Frank W. McCulloch, Collective Bargaining Forum, New York City,
May 12, 1969.
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of action and the freedom of individual members to pursue an indepen-
dent course of action is a conflict of long standing in which advocates of
both positions can enlist policy arguments supporting their respective
positions. Because of the intensity of opinion which marks both union
and management camps on this issue, the floodgate of criticism with
which these decisions were greeted was not wholly unexpected. The
most vocal criticism has, as expected, come from management, though
unions are not at all happy over the prospect of having union discipline
challenged as an unfair labor practice. In short, these decisions have
evoked a crescendo of criticism, which has all but drowned out the
calmer, quieter voices of reason.
None of the decisions in the new trilogy broke new legal ground.
Each decision merely reaffirmed and clarified existing law. Internal
means of union discipline, which do not affect members' employment
rights, had always been upheld against Taft-Hartley challenge, while
attempts to affect job rights as a method for enforcing union discipline
have consistently been held to violate 8(b)(1)(A) as well as other
sections. It is true that the Court injected the element of legiti-
macy of trade union objective into the determination of the legality
of discipline, but this is hardly surprising. The Court could not very
well have allowed unions to enforce rules which had no bona fide objec-
tive, and which at the same time offended statutory labor policy. To
have ruled otherwise would have been to abandon the very employees
for whose protection the NLRA was passed. As for the other criteria
to which the new trilogy refers, i.e., reasonableness, fairness and imposi-
tion against involuntary members, the Court itself has not yet given an
indication as to what standards will eventually be required, although
the Board, as we have seen, is now engaged in working out meaningful
and practical accommodations in these areas. Thus, on the whole, rather
than announcing a new doctrine, the new trilogy merely puts into
sharper focus the principles that traditionally governed the relation-
ship between union discipline and unfair labor practice charges. 141
141 Indeed, former Chairman McCulloch has recently questioned the overall significance
of these cases and their impact upon the future course of union discipline, indicating that
the importance of this line of cases might be far less than their critical reception would
suggest. Address by Frank W. McCulloch, An Overview of the National Labor Relations
Board: Perspectives Old and New, Controversial and Routine, Industrial Relations Law
& Human Behavior Seminar, University of Oklahoma, May 22, 1969. Quantitatively, in
McCulloch's words, "these cases may not be especially important, for scarcely two dozen
such cases have come before the National Labor Relations Board in its 34-year history."
Id.
These remarks, while serving to place these cases in their proper perspective amid
the rampant critical commentary, may have overshot the mark. It must be observed that
the relative infrequency of these disciplinary cases thus far is undoubtedly due in large
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The long-range importance of these cases lies in the impact they
will have on the future course of union administration. First, the fine
cases, Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, clearly establish, if not the full pic-
ture, at least the recognizable perimeters of discipline available to
unions, and there is every reason to suspect that unions will be anxious
to avail themselves of this newly confirmed area of authority. This will
be doubly true if the Board's Arrow Development Co. decision sur-
vives appellate scrutiny, thereby affording unions the opportunity to
recover fines large enough to warrant enforcement by lawsuit. Indeed,
the number of cases involving "reasonableness of union fines" suggests
that unions have already sharply increased their use of fines in the wake
of the new trilogy. Secondly, in Shipbuilding Workers, the Court estab-
lished a precedent whereby union members could challenge the dis-
cipline levied against them, without having to undertake the burden
of bringing or defending a lawsuit. Consequently, before establishing
rules governing members' conduct, unions must now consider the pos-
sibility that their enforcement may be challenged as an unfair labor
practice if the discipline affronts federal labor policy.
In summary, the principles of the new trilogy present a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, they open new avenues for strengthen-
ing the hand of weaker unions. At the same time, however, the Court
has placed checks on the union's use of this newly confirmed disciplinary
authority by permitting members to contest union penalties through
unfair labor practice procedures. Whether these two countervailing
results will tend to cancel each other out or whether one aspect will
prove considerably more significant than the other is a question that
only time and the multiple cases now before the NLRB can answer.
part to the fact that unions, as a practical matter, were unwilling to expend the time
and expense of prosecuting a civil suit for the small dollar amounts usually involved in
cases of this nature. Certainly, it is true that unions would prefer to collect and enforce
these fines by suspension or expulsion, rather than through judicial methods. If a member
is unwilling to comply with the organization's rules, most unions prefer to exclude such
an individual from the group, rather than fining the troublemaker. With the advent of
this new trilogy, however, there has been a tremendous upsurge in the number of union
discipline cases coming before the Board, and forthcoming decisions in this area should
have a significant effect on the volume of such cases for the future. Contrary to Mr.
McCulloch's remarks, the thrust of these 8(b)(1)(A) disciplinary cases could well have a
significant impact on future union disciplinary decisions.
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